An Intergenerational Model of Domestic Violence

I. Introduction
Domestic violence has been a high-profile social problem in recent years, and its prevalence and causes have been extensively discussed in the social science literature and the popular media.
The effects of domestic (i.e., marital or spousal) violence have also received considerable attention from researchers, and our knowledge about the economic, social, and psychological consequences of physical violence in marriage has been increasing. 1 One focus of this attention has been the possible effects on children who witness violence within the family, including effects on their own tendency to perpetrate or experience domestic violence as adults. The phrase "cycle of violence" is commonplace in the literature on spouse abuse, but there have been few attempts to formally model the intergenerational transmission of domestic violence. This paper presents a simple model in which the prevalence of domestic violence in the long run depends upon both the intergenerational transmission of propensities for violence within families and on patterns of marriage and divorce.
Its intention is to provide a prototype of more complex models that might inform discussions of violence prevention and interventions, as well as to highlight potential problems in estimating the parameters of such a model and calculating the prevalence and correlates of domestic violence.
There are many variants of the "violence begets violence" hypothesis, ranging from assertions that abused children are more likely to become abusers themselves to concerns that viewing television violence will increase aggressive behavior among children. A principal strand in the cycle-of-violence literature examines the effects of witnessing violence between parents on the probability that children will experience violence in their own marriages, either as perpetrators or as victims. Considerable evidence has accumulated that there is a statistical relationship between violence in the parents' marriage and violence in the child's, but the intergenerational transmission mechanism is not clear. The level of marital violence will depend not only on how tendencies to commit and to tolerate violence are transmitted, but also on who marries whom, and on which marriages or relationships remain intact long enough to influence the behavior of children.
In this paper I show that the determinants of marriage and divorce are crucial to the transmission process and to the equilibrium level of domestic violence. The selection of partners and the dissolution of violent relationships will depend on individual characteristics that may be correlated with past experiences of violence and with individual propensities for violence. The actual cycle of violence is therefore a complex phenomenon and identifying effective points of intervention, as well as assessing the costs of domestic violence, depend upon understanding the underlying transmission process. To explain the process and to focus attention on important gaps in our empirical knowledge, I propose a formal model of domestic violence across generations that includes marriage formation and dissolution. The model distinguishes between the short-run level of marital violence and the long-run or steady-state level. Both are important but with intergenerational transmission, the long run can be very long.
The basic framework is one in which husbands may or may not be violent, and in which the wives of violent husbands may or may not divorce them. Men who are raised in violent homes are more likely to be violent as adults, while women who witness domestic violence as children are more likely to remain with an abusive spouse. I initially assume that children are affected by domestic violence only if their mothers fail to leave an abusive partner, then explore an alternative specification in which divorce is imperfectly protective. The transmission mechanism of the model is consistent with, but is not implied by, extensive evidence of a positive correlation between parental domestic violence and future involvement in an abusive relationship. In section II I discuss the empirical evidence that informs the intergenerational transmission model. A severe shortage of reliable evidence concerning the relationships between marriage, divorce, family background, and violence makes it difficult to assess alternative modeling strategies.
In section III I provide an overview of the model and in section IV develop the simplest version of the model, a version with no divorce and random mating. In this version of the model, the equilibrium level of violence will depend, rather unsurprisingly, on the only two probabilities in the model: the probability that men from violent homes will be violent, and the probability that men from nonviolent homes will be violent. In section V I add divorce. The addition of divorce makes the equilibrium level of violence depend on two additional probabilities: the probability that a woman from a violent family of origin will stay with a violent husband, and the probability that a woman from a nonviolent family of origin will stay with a violent husband.
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The addition of divorce focuses attention on the marriage market. Because ongoing domestic violence depends upon the pairing of violent men with women who will stay with them, the prevalence of domestic violence depends on the marital matching process. In section VI I discuss assortative mating. In a version of a model that allows selective matching on the basis of family background characteristics associated with violence (i.e., women from violent homes are more likely to marry men from violent homes) I show that the equilibrium level of violence increases with positive assortative mating.
3 Section VII is a brief conclusion.
II. The Economics of Domestic Violence
Though the literature on domestic violence is vast, the literature within economics on this topic is scant. Several recent papers examine the effects of spousal abuse on economic outcomes such as women's employment (Lloyd [1997] , Bowlus and Seitz [1998] ), or attempt to measure the overall cost to society of domestic violence (Greaves, Hankivsky, and Kingston-Riechers [1995] ). Estimates of this cost depend upon the prevalence of violent marriages, which has proven very difficult to measure. Domestic violence is believed to be underreported on surveys, and difficulties in defining what constitutes "serious" spousal violence have meant that reported rates are sensitive to both the way questions are posed and the definitions used. In the U.S., the National Crime Victimization Survey yields estimates of annual rates violence by "intimates"
that remained at about 6.5 per thousand for women and 1.2-1.8 per thousand for men during the 1980s, but these rates jumped sharply in the early 1990s when the survey was revised. These rates are much lower than those implied by the National Family Violence Surveys of 1975 and 2 The addition of divorce also focuses attention on the determinants of divorce. Because the propensity of wives to remain with violent husbands is crucial, explicitly modeling economic dimensions, such as the earnings of women and men and the availability of welfare benefits, is likely to be fruitful. 3 One can make a priori arguments for negative rather than positive assortative mating and, for that matter, for negative rather than positive patterns of intergenerational transmission (e.g., arguing that those who grow up in violent homes realize how bad violence is and avoid it in choosing partners and in their own lives). Although some individuals may react in this way, the empirical evidence (e.g., Kalmuss [1994] ) suggests that the intergenerational correlations are positive. Violence in the previous generation is a risk factor for violence.
1985, which asked about specific types of violent behavior between husbands and wives (and did not require that the respondent identify this behavior as a "crime"). Rates of "severe" husbandto-wife violence of about 30 per thousand are implied by the responses to this survey, and reported rates of severe wife-to-husband violence are even higher. 4 A recent Canadian data source, the Violence Against Women Survey, finds that 29 percent of ever-married women and 50 percent of divorced women have been the victims of spousal abuse.
Most economists who have attempted to explain domestic violence rather than document its prevalence and effects, such as Tauchen, Witte, and Long [1991] , Tauchen and Witte [1995] and Tiefenthaler [1996,1997] , have taken a game-theoretic approach to this analysis.
Tauchen, Witte, and Long consider a noncooperative game in which violence has both expressive and instrumental components: violence increases the husband's utility directly, and may also increase his utility indirectly through control of his wife's behavior. Their paper, the most serious sustained attempt to account for domestic violence within the framework of a bargaining model of marriage, specifies a two-stage game; whether there is violence in equilibrium depends on the level of resources controlled by each spouse and on whether the reservation utility constraint is binding (e.g., whether the wife is no better off remaining in the marriage than she would be if she left). Farmer and Tiefenthaler [1997] present a noncooperative model of domestic violence that implies that wives' income and other financial support available from outside the marriage will decrease the level of violence in intact families.
In a game-theoretic context, violence or the threat of violence can be regarded as an aspect of the "threat point" in a cooperative bargaining model or as part of a "punishment strategy" in a non-cooperative game. 5 This framework points to factors such as the wife's employment status or potential earnings, or the attractiveness of her alternatives outside the marriage, as determinants of the incidence of marital violence. Empirical studies of the wife's 4 Blau [1998, pp. 155-158] reports these rates and provides references for the U.S. surveys. She concludes that there is no evidence of an upward trend in domestic violence in these surveys. 5 Lundberg and Pollak [1993] [1991] find the expected negative relationship between violence and women's income for lowand middle-income families in their sample. Farmer and Tiefenthaler [1996] analyze the effectiveness of shelters and other services for battered women, and argue that the use of such services can be a signal of a women's unwillingness to tolerate domestic violence. Tauchen and Witte [1995] examine the effectiveness of alternative police practices (i.e., advising the couple; separating them temporarily; arresting the suspected perpetrator) in response to domestic violence calls. An interesting paper by Bloch and Rao [1997] finds patterns of wife abuse in a sample from Southern India that appear to be related to inter-household transfers, and in which transfers appear to be driven by costs and benefits. In this paper I ignore bargaining and rational choice in order to focus on an aspect of the empirical evidence concerning domestic violence that game-theoretic models have not addressed --the positive correlation between marital violence experienced by parents and children. There is considerable evidence of an intergenerational correlation: Straus [1995] asserts: "The idea that child-abusing parents were themselves victims of abuse, and that wife-beating husbands come from violent families, is now widely accepted." (Straus [1995, p. 406] ). 6 In this paper, however, I ignore child abuse and consider only domestic violence.
III.
An Overview of the Model
I propose and analyze an intergenerational model of domestic violence in which behavioral strategies or scripts are transmitted from parents to children: boys and girls learn the adult roles of husbands and wives from their fathers and mothers. 7 The substantial literature on epidemiology of family violence recognizes multiple pathways of transmission, from witnessing violence in the community to being a victim of family violence. The model assumes a particular transmission 6 Using the survey data collected by Straus and Gelles, Kalmuss [1994] provides some badly needed quantification. She reports that both marital violence and parent-child violence in family of origin are related to domestic violence. "When neither form of aggression occurred in one's childhood family, the probability of (husbandwife) aggression is 1%... When only parent-child hitting occurred, the probability is increased to 3%.... When only parental hitting, the probability doubles to 6%. Finally, when both types of childhood aggression occurred, the probability of severe (husband-wife) aggression is 12%." (p. 15) 7 The model is thus broadly consistent with models of "cultural transmission" such as those proposed by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [1981] and by Boyd and Richerson [1985] , but the emphasis here is on intergenerational transmission pathway--witnessing domestic violence in the family of origin-though modeling a transmission mechanism that allows genetic as well as environmental components is clearly desirable.
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Marriages and divorces depend upon violence and propensities for violence in rather simple ways, but I do not model the optimizing behavior of individuals.
The model rests upon three key assumptions:
1. The probability that a husband will be violent depends on whether he grew up in a violent home.
2. The probability that a wife will remain with a violent husband depends on whether she grew up in a violent home.
3. Individuals who grew up in violent homes tend to marry individuals who grew up in violent homes; individuals who grew up in nonviolent homes tend to marry individuals who grew up in nonviolent homes.
The assumption that marital violence is asymmetric, that the husband is the perpetrator and the wife the victim, is at odds with survey evidence that wives report as many acts of violence towards their husbands as by their husbands. 9 The usual assumption that most serious injury is inflicted by men, however, is supported by the National Crime Victimization Survey, which reports much higher rates of violence towards women, and by relative rates of homicide by intimates. propensities and probabilities rather than on utility maximization and strategic behavior. It thus within families and not on intragenerational transmission and peers. 8 Wrangham and Peterson [1996] argue that the human male propensity for domestic violence has deep roots in the evolutionary history of our species, but their argument has no obvious implications for understanding differences in behavior across societies, changes in behavior within societies over time, or differences in the behavior of individuals within a society. 9 Straus and Gelles [1986] ; Straus [1997] . 10 Bachman and Saltzman [1995] .
follows the precedent of demographic, epidemiological, and evolutionary models rather than of rational choice models. 11 By avoiding the complications of rational choice, I can focus on other complications. A thorough-going rational choice version of the IMDV would require allowing individuals to make choices regarding marriage, fertility, violence, and divorce; it would also require making preferences endogenous and recognizing the role of parents in shaping and molding their children's preferences.
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The model is suggestive, however, of how economic factors, policy variables, and social and cultural factors might influence domestic violence through the probabilities that are the parameters of the model. For example, economic factors such as earnings and the availability of welfare benefits might influence domestic violence primarily through their effect on marriage and divorce probabilities. 13 The model may thus cast some light on the effect on domestic violence of welfare reform policies that create incentives to keep marriages together because such policies are likely to increase the probability that violent as well as nonviolent marriages remain intact. Policy variables, such as the way police respond to domestic violence complaints and the way courts treat domestic violence cases, might influence domestic violence primarily through their direct effect on violence probabilities. The social and cultural acceptability of violence might also influence violence probabilities and probabilities of divorce in the event of violence.
The basic structure of the IMDV can be described with the use of a time line. We begin in period t with an initial vector showing the number of men and the number of women of each type in the population where types are defined in terms of sex and home environment (violent/nonviolent).
The model specifies a sequence of five stages that defines a mapping of the population by type in period t into the population by type in period t+1:
11 Unlike evolutionary games in which fitness is density dependent, I assume that survival probabilities and reproductive success are independent of the composition of the population and identical for all individuals. 12 On the transmission of preferences, see Pollak [1976] , Becker [1992] , Pollak and Watkins [1993] , and Becker [1996] . 13 It would be more difficult to generalize the model to include an intergenerational transmission mechanism for earnings, and to allow earnings or earnings prospects to play a role in the marriage market.
(1) marriages (2) 
This sequence reflects a number of important assumptions. First, realized violence affects neither marriage nor fertility. If signals regarding propensities for violence are broadcast during courtship, we might expect to see assortative mating and systematic differences in marriage and fertility rates between different types of individuals. Second, I begin with the assumption that divorce occurs, if at all, before enough violence has occurred to affect the future behavior of children (e.g., because divorce is triggered by the signal that violence will occur rather than by the occurrence of violence).
I then examine the consequences of relaxing the assumption that in the intergenerational transmission process divorce is "fully protective" of children.
IV. The Simplest IMDV: No Divorce and Random Mating I begin with notation to characterize the population distribution in period t: = is an important benchmark.
The simplest version of the IMDV assumes that mating is random with respect to the family background (violent/nonviolent) of men and women, and that marriages cannot be dissolved. I
begin by calculating the fraction of violent homes in period t+1, assuming random mating and no divorce: In equilibrium, π π π = = + t t 1 , so that (1b) implies
We can investigate the existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics properties of the long-run equilibrium by solving (2a) for π as a function of p v and p v
Clearly, this simple version of the IMDV has a unique long-run equilibrium. Furthermore, it is straightforward to show from equation (3) 
Differences between the long-run and short-run effects of a change in the parameters on the level of violence can be easily seen in this simple model. For example, an increase in the probability that a man from a violent home will be violent will have a smaller impact on the rate of violence in the next period (differentiate (1b) with respect to p v ), than it will have on the equilibrium level of violence (from (3)).
The dynamics are also straightforward. Equation (1c) There are three interesting special cases:
That is, if the probability that a man will be violent is the same regardless of whether he comes from a violent or a nonviolent home, then the equilibrium is equal to this common probability. 
V. Divorce
From this intuitively obvious starting-point, we add divorce to the model, assuming that women who grew up in nonviolent homes are less likely to stay with violent husbands than are women from violent homes. Even with random mating, so that there is no selective matching of men and women with violent family backgrounds or characteristics correlated with violent family backgrounds, this extension makes the model much more complex by adding two parameters and destroying linearity. There are, however, a number of interesting special cases that are analytically tractable: for example, if women from nonviolent homes never stay married to violent husbands, then (provided none of the other probability parameters assumes a boundary value of 0 or 1), the fraction of nonviolent homes must increase over time and the only possible equilibrium is one in which violence disappears. I begin by assuming that divorce is "fully protective" in the sense that children who grow up in single parent families have the same propensities to violence and to divorce as children who grow up in nonviolent two parent families.
Willingness to divorce a violent husband is assumed to depend upon the type of home the wife grew up in: s v = the probability that a women will stay married to a violent husband if she grew up in a violent home, and s v = the probability that a women will stay married to a violent husband if she grew up in a nonviolent home. = is an important benchmark. 17 With the introduction of divorce, the probability that a man has a propensity to be violent and the probability that an observed marriage will be violent are no longer equal. Empirical studies of domestic violence and its effects must recognize that this selectivity implies that observed violent marriages constitute a population of households that differ 17 We could also introduce notation for the probabilities that women from each type of home will stay married to systematically in terms of other characteristics as well, and many of these other characteristics will influence the experiences and characteristics of children.
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We need to distinguish among four types of marriages, depending on the type of home in which the husband grew up and the type of home in which the wife grew up. For each type, we have a probability that the husband will be violent and, for each type, a probability that the wife will stay married if her husband is violent. Hence, given the fraction of violent homes in period t, we can calculate the fraction of violent homes in period t+1: Bowlus and Seitz [1998] find that domestic violence plays an important role in the divorce decision: the divorce rate of women in the Canadian VAWS who were not abused was 15%, while the divorce rate for women who reported being severely abused in their first marriage was 75%.
theorem, and the observations that = = , so the probability that a wife will stay married to a violent husband is independent of whether she grew up in a violent or a nonviolent home. In this case, because p v and p v are always multiplied by the common value of s and because s appears nowhere else, we can attach the common "staying probability" to p v and p v ; using the newly defined parameters, 19 This argument ignores the two boundary cases (i.e., s p v v = 0 and s p v v = 1) and assumes that the strict inequalities hold. 20 Although figure 2 shows a quadratic that decreases monotonically on the interval [0,1], the argument does not depend on this assumption but is consistent with any quadratic satisfying our end point conditions. It is not difficult to show that G(π) must be decreasing at π = 0 and at the equilibrium π = π*. It may, however, reach a minimum on the interval (π*, 1) and be increasing at π = 1.
the model with common divorce rates becomes formally identical to the reparameterized model without divorce. Using the earlier argument, we have an expression for the equilibrium level of violence that is analogous to equation (3):
Not surprisingly, divorce prevents the transmission of some violence under our assumptions, and so reduces the equilibrium level of violence.
Case 2. Suppose p p p v v = = , so that the probability that a man will be violent is independent of whether he grew up in a violent home. In this case intergenerational transmission takes place only through the propensity of women to remain with violent husbands. We can attach the common "violence probability" to s v and s v and, rewrite (5b) using the newly defined parameters, One solution is clearly π = 0 , the case in which violence disappears. In fact, this is the only admissible solution unless other parameters also assume boundary values. To see this, notice that if π ≠ 0 , we can divide through by π and the equilibrium condition becomes
That is I now relax the assumption that the transmission process is such that divorce is fully protective for children born into violent families and assume instead that divorce is only partially protective. This may be the case if propensities to commit or to tolerate violence are transmitted from parents to children by some mechanism other than the actual observation of violence, or if some violence precedes the divorce. More precisely, I assume that for a child born into a violent family, divorce is fully protective with probability γ and not at all protective with probability (1-γ).
It is convenient to define a parameter t π to represent the fraction of children who possess the propensities characteristic of children who grew up in violent homes. Thus t π will include both children who grew up in violent homes and children who left violent homes but for whom divorce was not protective. With this convention the equilibrium level of domestic violence, π, will be less than the equilibrium level of t π ; women who divorce will not themselves be victims of violence, but with probability (1-γ) their children will carry the same propensities as children who grew up in violent homes. 21 Two comments about this specification are in order: (i) Although I have assumed that transmission is based on learning and imitation, if the transmission process includes genetic components, then divorce will not be fully protective.
(ii) The assumption that divorce is equally protective (or equally unprotective) for boys and their propensity to perpetrate violence and for girls and their propensity to tolerate violence is only a convenient simplification.
When divorce is not fully protective, the analogue of equation (5b) (1 ) assume random mating. It is useful to think of the allocation of individuals to submarkets as a two stage procedure. First select an individual at random from the population; with probability π t the individual will be from a violent home and with probability 1 − π t from a nonviolent home.
Second, assign the randomly selected individual to the appropriate pure submarket with probability σ and to the combined submarket with probability ( ) 1 − σ .
Characterizing marriages by the type of home (violent or nonviolent) in which the husband and the wife grew up, we distinguish among four types of marriages. In the two pure submarkets, however, only one of the four types is represented, while in the combined submarket all four types are represented. To establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the IMDV with divorce and assortative mating, we calculate the fraction of violent homes in period t+1: 
The first two terms represent the contributions of the two pure submarkets; the last four terms, the contribution of the combined submarket.
22 A similar situation arises in generalizing the one-sex model of classical stable population theory, which is inherently linear model, to a two-sex model, which is inherently nonlinear. Strong results in the generalized model require specific functional form assumptions; see Pollak [1990] .
Two polar cases are of special interest. When σ = 0, the two pure submarkets disappear and the model reduces to the random mating model discussed in section V. When σ = 1, the mixed or combined submarket disappears and the model reduces to "pure assortative mating" -individuals from violent homes marry individuals from violent homes, and individuals from nonviolent homes marry individuals from nonviolent homes. With pure assortative mating, equation (10a) Returning to the general case, we establish the existence of equilibrium as we did in the case of random mating, by moving π t +1 to the right hand side of (12a), and replacing π t +1 and π t by the equilibrium value, π. The equilibrium condition becomes We observe that, as with random mating,
The existence of an equilibrium value of π follows immediately from the continuity of the function G( , ) ⋅ σ and the intermediate value theorem. To establish uniqueness, we observe that with our oneparameter specification of assortative mating the function G( , ) ⋅ σ is quadratic. Hence, the argument from the random mating case applies here as well.
The greater the degree of assortative mating (i.e., the greater the value of σ), the greater the equilibrium level of domestic violence. This comparative statics result follows from the implicit function theorem. Since G( , ) π σ = 0 , we have
.
The uniqueness argument implies that the function G( , ) π σ crosses the x-axis exactly once on the interval [0,1] and that it is downward sloping at the point π * at which G( *, ) π σ = 0 ; hence
Thus In the IMDV, since domestic violence depends upon marriage between a man who is violent and a woman who is willing to stay, assortative mating on aspects of family background that are related to individual propensities for violence will increase the equilibrium level of domestic violence.
VII. Conclusion
The IMDV formalizes the commonplace notion of an intergenerational "cycle of domestic violence." The model is obviously a highly stylized representation of domestic violence and its transmission. It treats intergenerational transmission as stochastic --witnessing domestic violence in the family of origin is a risk factor, not an inexorable precursor of violence.
The motivation for violence is purely expressive and not at all instrumental: violence and threats of violence are not manifestations of power used to enforce allocational or distributional outcomes. The IMDV is thus consistent with the "culture of violence" analysis emphasized by Straus and Gelles [1995] rather than with recent work, including my own work with Lundberg, Lundberg and Pollak [1993 , 1994 , on bargaining models of marriage. Because the IMDV is not a rational choice model, it does not fit easily into the economic analysis of the family. The model could, however, be modified to allow choice and maximizing behavior at the key decision points or nodes-marriage, fertility, divorce, and violence-while maintaining the emphasis on intergenerational linkages.
The IMDV calls attention to three features neglected in the domestic violence literature.
The first is the marriage market. If some men are more likely than others to be violent as husbands and some women are more likely than others to remain in violent marriages, then the probability that such individuals marry each other is crucial. Furthermore, to the extent that these assortative mating results generalize to more complex specifications, the equilibrium level of domestic violence increases monotonically with assortative mating on the basis of violence and of characteristics related to violence in families of origin. The second neglected feature is divorce: ongoing domestic violence requires the conjunction of a husband who is violent and a wife who stays. Recognition of the importance of the marriage market and divorce is crucial to calculating appropriate measures of the prevalence and correlates of domestic violence because such measures depend on whether the population at risk is defined as couples who entered marriage at a particular date or as married couples at a particular date. 23 Third, variables and policies that reduce the rate of domestic violence in the short run are likely to reduce it even further in the long run. Amplification of the impact effect follows from the dynamics of intergenerational transmission: a permanent change in an economic or policy variable that reduces the rate of violence in period t reduces it even further in period t+1 and beyond because it reduces the fraction of individuals who grew up in violent families.
23 Similar analytic issues arise in thinking about the correlates of welfare or unemployment; the population entering welfare at a particular date looks very different from the population of welfare recipients.
